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ABSTRACT
This article revisits marine bioprospecting in the Southern Ocean in
the context of the efforts to develop an international legally binding
instrument (ILBI) under the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine bio-
logical diversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction. After briefly
introducing the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), this article examines
the extent to which the ILBI will likely spatially overlap with the ATS.
As the next step, it is highlighted that future provisions on marine
genetic resources (MGRs) in the ILBI might substantively differ from
the way the ATS currently regulates bioprospecting. Based on that,
the final section reflects on how the ILBI will normatively and institu-
tionally relate to the ATS.
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Introduction
Bioprospecting activities in the Southern Ocean have already prompted substantial
scholarly attention.1 As shown in this article, revisiting this issue is warranted, however,
in the context of efforts to develop an international legally binding instrument (ILBI)
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC)2 on the conserva-
tion and sustainable use of marine biological diversity in areas beyond national jurisdic-
tion (BBNJ).3
The Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction process (BBNJ process) initially started
in 2004,4 but decisively picked up pace in December 2017, when the United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA) decided to convene an intergovernmental conference (IGC),
in order to develop the text for a future ILBI.5 In Resolution 72/249, the UNGA sched-
uled four substantive sessions of the IGC, and at the time of writing, three out of four
sessions have already taken place.6 While the BBNJ delegations are still negotiating the
ILBI’s content, it is noteworthy that the President of the Conference prepared a first
Draft Text for the ILBI prior to IGC III.7
As one of its four subject matters, the ILBI is intended to address “marine genetic
resources, including questions on the sharing of benefits.”8 However, the ILBI will not
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be developed in a legal vacuum, but rather within the context of the current global and
regional legal frameworks for BBNJ.9
Globally, the LOSC and the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD),10 albeit subject to
jurisdictional limitations,11 constitute two “main framework treaties” for BBNJ.12 In
addition to those global treaties, the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) represents an
example of a regional regime for BBNJ.13 The ATS consists, inter alia, of the Antarctic
Treaty (AT),14 the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources (CCAMLR),15 and the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic
Treaty (Madrid Protocol).16 The ILBI will thus likely overlap with the existing global
and regional regimes for BBNJ, which means that “a major concern in negotiating the
ILBI is the avoidance of the potential for fragmentation of the law and decision-making
procedures.”17
Bioprospecting, which can be defined as “the process of identifying unique character-
istics of marine organisms for the purpose of developing them into commercially valu-
able products,”18 is already subject to a complicated regulatory setting in the Southern
Ocean.19 The reason for this is that not only the different instruments of the ATS, but
also the LOSC and the CBD are relevant for its regulation in the Southern Ocean.20
To the extent that the future ILBI will apply to the Southern Ocean, the ILBI could
thus further complicate the current regulatory situation. For instance, Scott pointed in
the context of the BBNJ process to a “potentially competitive relationship between the
ATS and external regimes” for the regulation of bioprospecting.21 In this respect, Scott
further stressed that the “simultaneous or even sole regulation of Antarctic activities by
external regimes or organisations creates the risk that the ATS is more generally
undermined.”22
Against this backdrop, this article revisits the issue of marine bioprospecting in the
Southern Ocean in the context of the ongoing BBNJ negotiations. In so doing, the
second section briefly introduces the Antarctic Treaty and the ATS. The third section
examines the extent to which the ILBI will likely spatially overlap with the ATS. The
fourth section highlights that future provisions on marine genetic resources (MGRs) in
the ILBI might substantively differ from the way the ATS currently regulates biopros-
pecting. Based on that, the fifth section reflects on how the ILBI will normatively and
institutionally relate to the ATS, and the sixth section provides some conclusions.
The Antarctic Treaty and Antarctic Treaty System
The Antarctic Treaty was concluded in 1959 against the background of disputed sover-
eignty over Antarctica.23 As a key provision, Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty
“preserves the differing legal positions of the parties.”24 That refers to the position of
the seven claimant states,25 which asserted sovereignty over partly overlapping parts of
the Antarctic continent, as well as the position of the nonclaimant states, which have
previously rejected and continue to reject any claim to sovereignty over Antarctica.26
Thereby, the Antarctic Treaty “makes no attempt to settle the many conflicting territor-
ial claims in Antarctica, but, instead, “freezes” the legal status quo.”27 As a result of
Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty, there also remains one unclaimed sector in
Antarctica.28 Substantively, the Antarctic Treaty stipulates, inter alia, that “Antarctica
194 P. P. NICKELS
shall be used for peaceful purposes only”29 and provides for the “freedom of scientific
investigation in Antarctica and cooperation toward that end.”30
Subsequent to the conclusion of the Antarctic Treaty, states involved in the Antarctic
region reacted to upcoming environmental challenges by concluding additional instru-
ments, such as CCAMLR and the Madrid Protocol.31 CCAMLR, which has as its object-
ive, “the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources,”32 was adopted in light of
overexploitation of krill stocks in the Southern Ocean in the 1970s and its feared nega-
tive influence on the Southern Ocean’s food chain.33
The Madrid Protocol, on the other hand, was concluded after the previously adopted
Convention on Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources Activities (CRAMRA)34 failed
to enter into force,35 and aims to achieve “the comprehensive protection of the
Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems.”36 For that purpose,
the Madrid Protocol “designate[s] Antarctica as a natural reserve, devoted to peace and
science”37 and bans commercial mining.38
Determining the Extent of a Future Overlap Between the ILBI and the
Antarctic Treaty System
Addressing the potential differences for the regulation of bioprospecting between the
ILBI and the ATS in the fourth section of this article is only necessary if the ILBI spa-
tially overlaps with the relevant instruments of the ATS, such as the Antarctic Treaty,
the Madrid Protocol, and CCAMLR. Johnson already briefly addressed the difficulties of
determining the extent of a future overlap between the ILBI and the ATS.39 The follow-
ing thus takes a closer look at this question, based on Johnson’s observations.
To begin with, the Antarctic Treaty, CCAMLR, and the Madrid Protocol vary in
terms of their geographical scope and thus apply to a variable degree to the Southern
Ocean off the shore of Antarctica.40 The Antarctic Treaty’s applicability to the water
column and seabed off the shore of Antarctica was a point of disagreement when the
Antarctic Treaty was negotiated.41 This led to the “compromise” in Article VI of the
Antarctic Treaty,42 which states that
the provisions of the present Treaty shall apply to the area south of 60 South Latitude,
including all ice shelves, but nothing in the present Treaty shall prejudice or in any way
affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any [s]tate under international law with
regard to the high seas within that area.
Although the wording in the first part of Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty indicates
its applicability to the entire area south of 60 South Latitude, this provision was origin-
ally interpreted as limiting the applicability of the Antarctic Treaty to the continent
itself.43 Yet, as convincingly argued by Auburn, “there would be no need to reserve
high seas freedoms if the Treaty did not apply to offshore waters.”44 In addition, the
interpretation that favors the applicability of the Antarctic Treaty to the maritime parts
of the Antarctic Treaty Area (ATA) finds support in state practice.45
CCAMLR applies to “the Antarctic marine living resources of the area south of 60
degrees South [L]atitude,” that is, to the ATA. In addition, CCAMLR is also applicable
to Antarctic marine living resources northward of the ATA up to “the Antarctic
Convergence which form part of the Antarctic marine ecosystem.”46 The Madrid
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Protocol applies to the ATA,47 but there is some discussion as to whether the reference
to “dependent and associated ecosystems” in Article 2 of the Protocol could entail a
broader applicability northward, beyond the ATA.48 To the extent that the future ILBI
will apply to the Southern Ocean, the exact area of overlap would thus need to be deter-
mined specifically for each of the relevant ATS instruments, as they differ in their geo-
graphical scope.
The extent to which the ILBI will likely apply to the area of application of the different
ATS instruments is questionable. The general spatial scope of the ILBI is envisioned to
extend to “areas beyond national jurisdiction” (ABNJ),49 which are defined in Article 1 of
the May 2019 Draft Text as the high seas and the Area.50 Under the LOSC, the high seas
and the Area are defined negatively in relation to areas under national jurisdiction.51 The
high seas encompasses “all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive eco-
nomic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a [s]tate, or in the archipela-
gic waters of an archipelagic [s]tate.”52 The Area, on the other hand, is defined as “the
seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”53
Thus far, the delegations at the BBNJ process have not devoted specific attention to
the Southern Ocean. The applicability of the ILBI to the Southern Ocean was not
addressed during the Preparatory Committee prior to the IGC,54 nor during IGC I, II,
and III. There is an interesting parallel here with the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), during which the LOSC was negotiated.
Antarctica and the Southern Ocean were mostly excluded from the negotiations during
UNCLOS III,55 except for the following statement by Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe in
his capacity as a delegate from Sri Lanka:56
I should make it clear that the question of the status of Antarctica is in no way linked with
the issues before the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and, therefore, this
question should not delay agreement on a new Convention on the Law of the Sea.57
This statement, combined with the fact that Antarctica and the Southern Ocean did not
otherwise feature prominently during UNCLOS III, led some commentators to conclude
that the LOSC was inapplicable to the Southern Ocean surrounding Antarctica.58
Against this view, Orrego Vicuna argued convincingly that “the exclusion of Antarctica
from the ambit of the 1982 Convention’s application would have required an express
provision to that effect, which certainly is not the case.”59 Specifically in terms of
Amerasinghe’s statement, which could have interpretative relevance as part of the draft-
ing history of the LOSC, relying on Article 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (VCLT),60 it is further noteworthy that this statement was in any case
merely concerned with the status of Antarctica and not directed at the general applic-
ability of the LOSC to the Southern Ocean.61 Similarly to the LOSC’s applicability to
the seabed and water column off the shore of Antarctica, it appears that the ILBI would
apply to those parts of the Southern Ocean that qualify as the high seas and the Area,
unless its applicability to the Southern Ocean is explicitly excluded at some point during
the BBNJ negotiations.
The extent of the high seas and the Area in the Southern Ocean, to which the ILBI
would apply, can potentially be limited by maritime zones under national jurisdiction
asserted from the Antarctic continent and from sub-Antarctic Islands.62 It is accepted
that maritime zones under national jurisdiction from sub-Antarctic Islands expand into
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the ATA, limiting the extent of ABNJ within the ATA, to which the ILBI would apply.63
In contrast, determining the extent of maritime zones under national jurisdiction from
the Antarctic continent is a difficult exercise.64
As a corollary of the disputed sovereignty over Antarctica, the very existence of
coastal states in Antarctica is subject to differing views among scholars, as well as
among the claimant and nonclaimant states.65 Based on the argument that there are no
coastal states in Antarctica, Joyner suggested that “the great white continent appears to
be surrounded exclusively by waters having the legal status of high seas.”66 Following
this logic, it was similarly proposed that the seabed and subsoil off the shore of
Antarctica could qualify as the Area.67 In terms of the unclaimed sector, Rogan-
Finnemore opined that “the unclaimed sector of Antarctica clearly does not generate
maritime zones and therefore the marine off-shore area of the unclaimed sector is con-
sidered high seas.”68 By implication, the seabed off the shore of the unclaimed sector
could also constitute the Area.69 Assuming that there are no coastal states in Antarctica,
the ILBI would thus apply to the entirety of the water column, as well as the seabed
surrounding the Antarctic continent, while its applicability to the Southern Ocean
would not extend to the maritime areas under national jurisdiction from the sub-
Antarctic Islands, mentioned in the preceding.70
However, the seven claimant states regard themselves as coastal states and have
asserted a variety of maritime zones from their claimed territories in Antarctica.71 For
instance, Australia, Argentina, Chile, and France have claimed an exclusive economic
zone (EEZ) from their respective sectors in Antarctica.72 In addition, the claimant states
have either submitted (preliminary) information to the Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf (CLCS) or instead reserved the right to submit such information
to the CLCS, as an expression of their assertion to a continental shelf beyond 200 miles
from the Antarctic continent.73 Evidently, accepting the validity of any maritime zones
under national jurisdiction asserted from the Antarctic continent would have the conse-
quence that the ILBI would not be applicable to those maritime areas, as they would
not qualify as ABNJ.
In addition to the controversy as to whether there are coastal states in Antarctica, a
secondary question is whether Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty prevents the claimant
states from asserting maritime zones under the LOSC that did not exist at all or not to
the same extent when the Antarctic Treaty was adopted in 1959.74 More specifically, it
is questionable if the assertion of a 12-mile territorial zone, a 200-mile EEZ, or a con-
tinental shelf within or beyond 200 miles, as provided for by the LOSC, would consti-
tute a “new claim” or an “enlargement of an existing claim” in the sense of Article IV
of the Antarctic Treaty.75 In this context, Johnson has argued that “the area of applica-
tion of the ILBI in the Southern Ocean cannot be wholly identified during the life of
Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty.”76 It appears, however, that Article IV of the
Antarctic Treaty would not per se make the area of application of the Southern Ocean
unidentifiable, but rather, subject to different interpretation among the claimant and
nonclaimant states,77 which was also acknowledged by Johnson.78
So far, the fundamentally opposing views regarding the validity of the asserted mari-
time zones under national jurisdiction from the Antarctic continent have been mediated
by the “self-restraint” of the seven claimant states.79 That is, the claimant states have
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mostly refrained from exercising port and coastal state jurisdiction in their asserted
maritime zones.80 The challenge of determining the extent of ABNJ within the area of
application of the ATS, to which the ILBI would apply, cannot be mediated in a similar
way. Instead, it would require the validity of the maritime zones under national jurisdic-
tion asserted from the Antarctic continent by the claimant states to be explicitly
addressed. This would also have been required in the case of the asserted extended con-
tinental shelf entitlements from the Antarctic continent;81 however, as noted by Scott,
“the economic and physical challenges associated with mineral exploitation [in the
Southern Ocean], render[ed] this issue largely moot.”82 This is not the case for biopros-
pecting, which is an ongoing activity in the Southern Ocean.83 In case the ILBI substan-
tively differs from how the ATS currently regulates bioprospecting—a point addressed
in the following—determining the extent of the ILBI’s applicability to the Southern
Ocean is of consequence and poses a delicate question.
Finally, as observed by Johnson, the area of application of the ATS encompasses
some ABNJ, even if the asserted maritime zones under national jurisdiction by the
claimant states are taken into account.84 The ILBI will thus, in any case, spatially over-
lap with the different instruments of the ATS, unless its applicability to the Southern
Ocean off the shore of Antarctica is explicitly excluded during the BBNJ negotiations.
The Regulation of Bioprospecting: Potential Differences Between the ILBI
and the Antarctic Treaty System
In ATCM Resolution 6 (2013), the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) expli-
citly acknowledged that bioprospecting “continues to occur in the Antarctic Treaty
area,” which includes the Southern Ocean up to 60 South Latitude.85 In addition, a
2018 Information Paper from the Netherlands (IP 29) provides an overview of the cur-
rent level of bioprospecting in the ATA and specifically highlights a “multitude of krill-
related patents and applications filed in the past two years.”86 While the ATCPs thus
agree that bioprospecting is an ongoing activity in the ATA, it is noteworthy that the
different instruments of the ATS do not mention, let alone define, bioprospecting or
genetic material/resources.87 This absence of “a working definition of biological prospec-
ting in the Antarctic context” was also stressed in ATCM Resolution 6 (2013).88 The
Antarctic Treaty and other instruments of the ATS, such as CCAMLR and the Madrid
Protocol, do, however, include various general provisions that are relevant to
bioprospecting.89
Bioprospecting has also received considerable attention by the ATCPs at their annual
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCM) since 2002 and, in particular, during
two Intersessional Contact Groups in 2007 and 2009.90 For example, the second
Intersessional Contact Group focused on issues such as (i) potential definitions of gen-
etic material and resources, (ii) the regulation of access to genetic specimens, (iii) ques-
tions of benefit-sharing, (iv) the need to give advance notice of and reporting on
biological prospecting activities, (v) the free exchange of scientific information, and (vi)
the applicable intellectual property regimes.91 While the ATCPs have so far been unable
to agree on any legally binding regulation for bioprospecting,92 they did adopt three
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resolutions on bioprospecting in 2005, 2009, and 2013, respectively.93 However, these
are only of hortatory character.94
At the BBNJ negotiations, states have been and still are particularly divided in terms
of how to regulate MGRs in the new ILBI.95 This disagreement is partly rooted in diver-
gent interpretations of the current law under the LOSC, especially as far as MGRs in
the Area are concerned.96 The term “MGRs” is not mentioned in the LOSC, and the
BBNJ delegations have yet to agree on a definition.97 In addition to the question of how
to define MGRs, the negotiating states are also discussing other issues, including (i) the
geographical, material, and temporal scope of future provisions on MGRs; (ii) whether
the MGRs should be governed by the freedoms of the high seas or instead by the com-
mon heritage of mankind principle; (iii) how to regulate (if at all) access to MGRs; (iv)
whether to include only nonmonetary or also monetary benefit-sharing obligations; and
(v) how (if at all) the future ILBI should deal with intellectual property rights connected
to MGRs.98
In those parts of the Southern Ocean where the ILBI and the ATS might overlap, bio-
prospecting activities would be regulated by the ATS as well as by a future ILBI. As dis-
cussed further in the following, for ATS state parties that also become party to the ILBI,
there may be uncertainty as to which regime to comply with, particularly if the ATS
and the ILBI provide for conflicting regulation of bioprospecting. Owing to space con-
straints, this article cannot provide a thorough overview of the different suggestions
made by the BBNJ delegations for future provisions on MGRs99 and compare those sug-
gestions to the current regulation of bioprospecting under the ATS.100 However, in
order to illustrate the potential for substantive differences between the two regimes, the
next section of this article compares the suggestions made during the BBNJ negotiations
for two key aspects of MGR regulation, namely, the regulation of in situ access to
MGRs, and the nonmonetary and monetary benefit-sharing obligations, with how the
ATS currently regulates those issues.
The Regulation of In Situ Access
For the purpose of bioprospecting, marine specimens can be accessed “in situ,” which
refers to “collecting samples of marine organisms (containing genetic material) within
their natural surroundings.”101 This can be contrasted to ex situ and in silico access.
The term “ex situ” describes accessing MGRs “away from their natural surroundings,
such as from culture collections, museums and research institutions,” whereas “in silico”
refers to “direct access to genetic data, such as whole genomes or isolated gene
sequences.”102 While the delegations at the BBNJ negotiations disagree as to whether
the future ILBI should cover ex situ and in silico access, there is agreement that the
ILBI should apply to in situ access.103 However, when it comes to how in situ access
should be regulated, differing views are held by the members of the delegations. Coye-
Felson, the facilitator for the Informal Working Group on MGRs, summarized the
discussions at IGC III in 2019 by noting that some delegations favored “free and unim-
peded access,” while others supported that in situ access should be “subject to prior
notification or a licensing system.”104
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Despite not regulating bioprospecting explicitly, the different instruments of the ATS
provide for various general provisions that can be construed as being relevant to the
conduct of bioprospecting in the Southern Ocean, including in situ access.105 As noted
in the preceding, the Antarctic Treaty generally grants the “freedom of scientific inves-
tigation.”106 While the term scientific investigation is left undefined in the Antarctic
Treaty,107 ATCM Resolution 9 (2009) on bioprospecting explicitly refers to Article II of
the Treaty.108 The freedom of scientific investigation, and thus the “freedom of bio-
prospecting,” is however, only granted “subject to the provisions” of the Antarctic
Treaty.109 For instance, pursuant to Article III(c) of the Antarctic Treaty, state parties
are “to the greatest extent feasible and practicable” obliged to exchange “information
regarding plans for scientific programs in Antarctica.”110 In addition, Article VII(5)
requires states “to give … notice in advance, of … all expeditions to and within
Antarctica, on the part of its ships or nationals, and all expeditions to Antarctica organ-
ized in or proceeding from its territory.”111 The Madrid Protocol further provides for a
number of obligations when conducting bioprospecting activities,112 such as the obliga-
tion to conduct an environmental impact assessment pursuant to Article 8 of the
Madrid Protocol.113 Furthermore, Article 3 Annex II and Article 7 Annex V of the
Madrid Protocol may require a permit for the collection of biological specimens for bio-
prospecting purposes.114 Notably, ATCM Resolution (2009) points to Annexes II and V
of the Madrid Protocol in the context of bioprospecting.115 Yet, as stressed by Drankier
et al., the permit requirements in Article 3 of Annex II of the Madrid Protocol do not
apply to microorganisms and marine specimens, which they labeled “an important
limitation.”116
The ATCPs established the Electronic Information Exchange System (EIES)117 as a
simplified mechanism for the state parties to the Antarctic Treaty and the Madrid
Protocol to comply with their various reporting requirements.118 However, Information
Paper 29 (2018) noted that since 2005 “only a few ATCPs … have provided informa-
tion on biological prospecting in the Antarctic Treaty area, and none of them on a
regular basis.”119 In this context, Puig-Marco has highlighted that one fundamental
problem is the lack of an agreed definition of bioprospecting, which means that there is
no common understanding of what should be reported through the EIES.120 In addition
to the Antarctic Treaty and the Madrid Protocol, Article 20(2) of CCAMLR requires
states to report, inter alia, “information about their harvesting activities” to the
CCAMLR Commission, which may be relevant to bioprospecting, if bioprospecting
involves harvesting marine resources.121
To conclude, the ATS provides for a certain level of general obligations, which can be
interpreted as being relevant for accessing MGRs in situ. There is consequentially a
potential for substantive differences to arise between the current regulation of in situ
access to MGRs under the ATS and the proposals in the ILBI. The ILBI would likely be
less demanding, in comparison with the ATS, if it provided for “free and unimpeded
access” to MGRs, as suggested by some delegations.122 By contrast, however, if the ILBI
incorporated a “prior notification or a licensing system” for accessing MGRs in situ,123
then whether the ILBI would stipulate more or less stringent requirements for in situ
access than the ATS currently does would be determined by the specific requirements
of the future regulatory regime. For example, a potential licensing system under the
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ILBI could provide for stricter regulation of in situ access compared to the ATS, since
the permit requirement in Annex II of the Madrid Protocol is inapplicable to mar-
ine specimens.
Nonmonetary and Monetary Benefits
The BBNJ delegations are currently divided when it comes to the question of benefit-
sharing obligations in the ILBI.124 During IGC I in 2018, one view suggested that the
future ILBI should only provide for nonmonetary benefit-sharing obligations.125 As
potential nonmonetary benefit-sharing obligations, the President’s Aid to Negotiations,
which was prepared after IGC I, listed “capacity-building, the exchange and public avail-
ability of information and scientific knowledge, access to samples and sample collec-
tions, access to technology and technical knowledge and transfer of technology.”126 By
contrast, other delegations favored the inclusion of both nonmonetary and monetary
benefit-sharing obligations.127 These differing views were reiterated during the second
substantive session of the ICG in 2019.128 For example, the African Group and the
Caribbean Community supported the inclusion of mandatory nonmonetary and monet-
ary benefit-sharing obligations.129 The Russian Federation and the United States, on the
other hand, opposed any monetary benefit-sharing obligation, arguing that the ILBI
should instead be limited to addressing voluntary nonmonetary benefit-sharing.130
Article 11 of the 2019 Draft Text for the ILBI reflects the differing views in terms of
whether the ILBI should provide for only voluntary nonmonetary benefit-sharing obli-
gations or, instead, for mandatory nonmonetary and monetary benefit-sharing obliga-
tions. At the time of writing, this question remains unresolved, since the negotiating
states were unable to reach agreement in terms of the content of benefit-sharing obliga-
tions for the future ILBI during IGC III in 2019.131
The Antarctic Treaty provides for nonmonetary benefit-sharing obligations pursuant
to Article III(1)(c) of the Antarctic Treaty, which requires that “scientific observations
and results from Antarctica shall be exchanged and made freely available.” In this con-
text, scholars have discussed the extent to which bioprospecting is subsumable under
the term scientific observations and results, which is not defined in the Antarctic
Treaty.132 Without addressing this issue in great detail, it can be noted that the three
resolutions on bioprospecting, adopted by the ATCPs in 2005, 2009, and 2013, respect-
ively, all mention Article III(1)(c) of the Antarctic Treaty in the context of bioprospect-
ing.133 This may indicate that Article III(1)(c) of the Antarctic Treaty applies generally
to bioprospecting.134 Jabour and Nicol observed, however, that “the precise nature of
the disclosure requirements imposed on Antarctic Treaty parties by Art. III(1)(c) is …
unclear.”135 In addition, Article III(1)(b) of the Antarctic Treaty also provides that
“scientific personnel shall be exchanged in Antarctica between expeditions and stations,”
which may also be relevant to bioprospecting activities.136
While arguably providing for some vague nonmonetary benefit-sharing obligations,
the ATS lacks any monetary benefit-sharing obligations.137 The introduction of monet-
ary benefit-sharing obligations linked to bioprospecting was, however, discussed by the
ATCPs, inter alia, during the already-mentioned second Intersessional Contract Group
on bioprospecting in 2009. Here, one view opposed the introduction of monetary
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benefit-sharing, arguing “that there was no compelling reason why benefits from the com-
mercialisation of Antarctic biological material should be treated differently from other
uses of Antarctica, which are not subject to a sharing regime.”138 Contrary to this view, it
was proposed “that commercial benefit-sharing should be addressed when scientific obser-
vations and results from research on Antarctic biological material are controlled by a
patent or some other means, and thus no longer freely available or usable.”139 Meanwhile,
it can be noted that CRAMRA would have provided for some monetary benefit-sharing
obligations in the context of Antarctic mineral resource exploitation.140 However,
CRAMRA never entered into force and was replaced by the Madrid Protocol, which pro-
hibits commercial mining.141 At present the ATS does thus not currently provide for any
monetary benefit-sharing obligations linked to bioprospecting.
Similar to the regulation of in situ access, there is therefore an opportunity for sub-
stantive differences to develop between the ATS and a future ILBI in relation to non-
monetary and monetary benefit-sharing obligations. Since the ATS does not provide for
any monetary benefits, the inclusion of such benefits would clearly subject bioprospect-
ing in the Southern Ocean to an additional obligation under the ILBI. The ILBI might
also provide for more detailed and clear obligations to share nonmonetary benefits than
imposed by the ATS. By contrast, the suggestion by some delegations that the ILBI
should only include voluntary nonmonetary benefits would be less demanding than the
ATS, since the ATS does provide for mandatory, albeit vague, nonmonetary benefit-
sharing obligations.
Normative and Institutional Integration of the ILBI Within the Antarctic
Treaty System
The likely spatial overlap between the ILBI and the ATS, combined with the potential
for substantive differences for the regulation of bioprospecting, begs the question of
how the ILBI would normatively and institutionally relate to the ATS. Notably, the
ATCPs have directly reacted to the BBNJ process in the form of a statement issued at
the ATCM in 2017.142 In this statement, the ATCPs asserted “that the Antarctic Treaty
System is the competent framework within which to address the conservation and sus-
tainable use of biodiversity in the Antarctic region.”143 More specifically, in terms of
bioprospecting, the United States noted at the subsequent ATCM in 2018 that “some
areas in the Southern Ocean might be covered by a new BBNJ instrument” and pro-
posed to let “the discussions on BBNJ … play out further before the ATCM sends any
signals that marine genetic resources within either the Antarctic Treaty area or the
CAMLR Convention Area should be excluded from BBNJ.”144 In contrast to this sug-
gestion, “most delegations expressed the view that the Antarctic Treaty system must
continue to address the issue of bioprospecting, regardless of the BBNJ issue, in light of
its inherent competence regarding all activities in Antarctica.”145
Against this backdrop, the following discussion will reflect on how the ILBI will likely
relate normatively and institutionally to the ATS. The distinction between the normative
and institutional dimension of the ATS was made by Vidas in the context of the com-
mercial mining ban under the Madrid Protocol.146 Here, Vidas highlighted a potential
normative conflict between the prohibitive approach under the Madrid Protocol and the
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permissive approach toward commercial mining under Part XI of the LOSC.147 In add-
ition, he raised the question of decision-making competence, that is, whether the deci-
sion-making fora of the ATCM or, instead, the International Seabed Authority (ISA)
established under Part XI LOSC would be competent to regulate mining off the shore
of Antarctica where Part XI LOSC is applicable.148
In practice, this potential normative conflict and clash of decision-making compe-
tence did not prove contentious. In this respect, Scott and VanderZwaag stressed that
“the physical and economic challenges of mining in the Antarctic have largely alleviated
any political pressure to reconcile the relationship between the LOSC and the Antarctic
Treaty.”149 However, they predicted that “this may change” if the state parties of the
LOSC were to adopt the ILBI.150 Since the ILBI is envisioned as an agreement under
the LOSC, it has been suggested that the relationship between the LOSC and the ATS
could impact the future relationship between the ILBI and the ATS.151
Given the ATCP’s assertion of competence vis-a-vis the BBNJ process and, more spe-
cifically, in terms of bioprospecting, it can be noted that state parties of the ATS, which
will not become a party to the ILBI, would according to the pacta tertiis principle not
be bound by the ILBI.152 While this is straightforward, most state parties to the
Antarctic Treaty are also party to the LOSC.153 A more complex question is thus
whether the ILBI, as an agreement under the LOSC, will affect the interpretation of the
LOSC in the future. If this were the case, the ILBI could become relevant to LOSC state
parties that are not party to the ILBI. A similar question has arisen in the context of
the interpretative influence of the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating
to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks (UN Fish Stock Agreement) on the LOSC.154 In this situation, discussion
has focused on whether the UN Fish Stock Agreement qualifies either as a “subsequent
agreement” in the sense of Article 31 (3) (a) of the VCLT or instead as “other relevant
rules of international law” pursuant to Article 31 (3) (c) of the VCLT.155 While pursu-
ing this question is beyond the scope of this article, attention can be drawn to the
observation by Rothwell et al. that the ILBI’s future normative effect on the LOSC and,
more broadly, on the law of the sea will depend considerably on how many states will
become a party to it.156
Future Cross-Membership Between the Antarctic Treaty System and the ILBI
In addition to the question of the future interpretative influence of the IBLI on the
LOSC, it is noteworthy that ATS state parties including Australia, China, New Zealand,
Norway, and the Russian Federation are participating in the BBNJ negotiations and
might thus become a party to the future ILBI. As is well known, the pacta sunt servanda
rule, which was codified in Article 26 of the VCLT, stipulates that “every treaty in force
is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed in good faith.”157 ATS state
parties that also become party to the ILBI may have to decide which regime to comply
with if the ATS and the ILBI provide for conflicting regulation of bioprospecting.158 As
indicated in the preceding, the ILBI could subject bioprospecting in the Southern Ocean
to monetary benefit-sharing obligations, which the ATS currently does not provide for,
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or include more precise and demanding nonmonetary benefit-sharing obligations.
When it comes to in situ access, the suggestion by some BBNJ delegations to not regu-
late in situ access at all would be less demanding than the ATS, which includes some
regulation for in situ access. A suggested permit system in the ILBI for accessing MGRs
in situ, on the other hand, could entail more stringent regulation in comparison to
the ATS.
In addition, similar to the mineral resource ban under the Madrid Protocol, the ques-
tion of institutional competence, discussed in the preceding, may arise: that is, whether
the decision-making fora of the ATS, such as the ATCM or the CCAMLR Commission,
or a potential future body in the ILBI would be competent to regulate bioprospecting
activities in the Southern Ocean.159
In the face of a probable overlap between existing frameworks for managing BBNJ,
UNGA Resolution 72/249 formulated two normative criteria for the BBNJ process and
the future ILBI. The first normative criterion relates to the LOSC and requires that “the
work and results of the [intergovernmental] conference should be fully consistent with
the [LOSC].”160 The second normative criterion states that the “[BBNJ] process and its
results should not undermine existing relevant legal instruments and frameworks” as
well as “relevant global, regional and sectoral bodies” for BBNJ.161 In this respect,
Johnson observed that the Antarctic Treaty, CCAMLR, and the Madrid Protocol were
all mentioned as “relevant regional treaties” in an Indicative List of Regional Treaties.162
During IGC I, II, and III (2018–2019), none of the state parties of the different ATS
instruments that were participating in the BBNJ negotiations specifically reiterated the
assertion of competence of the ATS vis-a-vis the BBNJ process. So far, the normative
and institutional relationship between the ILBI and the ATS has thus not been specific-
ally discussed. It would appear, therefore, that a similar approach to that taken with
respect to the question of spatial applicability of the ILBI to the Southern Ocean is
being applied here. Unless the delegations at the BBNJ negotiations decide to explicitly
regulate the relationship between the ILBI and the ATS, the general criterion of not
undermining existing frameworks, instruments, and bodies will determine the future
relationship between the ILBI and the ATS.163
In the literature, the normative criterion of not undermining existing instruments, frame-
works, and bodies has been criticized for its “ambiguity.”164 For example, Dupuy and
Vi~nuales have argued that the notion of “not to undermine” could be either construed “as
ensuring a minimum level of protection to BBNJ (the new agreement would thus level the
playing field) or conversely, as a reminder that existing instruments … would prevail over
any potential agreement.”165 It is noteworthy that the May 2019 Draft Text for the ILBI
contains a suggestion for a conflict clause in Article 4(3) of the Draft Text, which would
operationalize and, thereby, potentially clarify the criterion of how not to undermine exist-
ing legal instruments, frameworks, and bodies. A conflict clause can be defined as “a clause
intended to regulate the relation between the provisions of the treaty and those of another
treaty or of any other treaty relating to the matters with which the treaty deals.”166 In its
current form, Article 4(3) of the 2019 Draft Text stipulates that the ILBI
shall be interpreted and applied in a manner that [respects the competences of and] does
not undermine [existing] relevant legal instruments and frameworks and relevant global,
regional and sectoral bodies, and that promotes coherence and coordination with those
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instruments, frameworks and bodies, provided that they are supportive of and do not run
counter to the objectives of the Convention and this Agreement.
The BBNJ negotiations are ongoing, which means that Article 4(3) of the 2019 Draft
Text only presents the current proposal for a conflict clause. While Article 4(3) of the
Draft Text might be subject to future change, it is noted that specific conflict clauses
enjoy priority in application in comparison to the more general conflict rules in the
VCLT.167 The future relationship between the ILBI and the ATS would thus be primar-
ily regulated by a future conflict clause in the ILBI, such as Article 4(3) of the Draft
Text, and not by the general rules of the VCLT.
However, Article 4(3) of the Draft Text would not be the only relevant conflict clause,
since Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty regulates the normative relationship between the
Antarctic Treaty and high seas freedoms in the ATA.168 When faced with two conflict
clauses that are relevant for the normative relationship between two overlapping treaties,
it was proposed that the later conflict clause ought to be the decisive one.169 This would
suggest that a future conflict clause in the ILBI, and not Article VI of the Antarctic
Treaty, would determine the relationship between the ILBI and the ATS.
In addition, conflict clauses may also fulfill a “clarification function” and thereby facili-
tate “the application of [a] … relevant treaty, its implementation, and consequently, its
effectiveness in achieving its object and purpose.”170 However, as cautioned by Matz-
L€uck, the degree to which conflict clauses can fulfill this function “depends to a consider-
able extent upon their wording and interpretation.”171 The wording of a future conflict
clause in the ILBI will thus impact the extent to which such a clause will allow for clear
guidance regarding the future normative and institutional relationship between the IBLI
and existing legal instruments and frameworks for BBNJ, such as the ATS.
Conflict clauses can be distinguished based on whether they claim priority over or
grant prevalence to other treaties.172 A second distinction is whether a conflict clause
claims or grants priority in a “conditional” or “unconditional” manner.173 Given its cur-
rent wording, the first part of Article 4(3) of the 2019 Draft Text requires that the ILBI
is “interpreted and applied in a manner that [respects the competences of and] does not
undermine [existing] relevant legal instruments and frameworks and relevant global,
regional and sectoral bodies, and that promotes coherence and coordination with those
instruments, frameworks and bodies.” In so doing, Article 4(3) of the Draft Text would
arguably not qualify as an unconditional conflict clause, as it would neither accord clear
priority to the ILBI over existing instruments and frameworks, nor clearly state that the
terms of existing instruments, frameworks, and bodies prevail over the ILIB.
For instance, the notion of “shall not undermine” would stipulate a condition that
would require interpreting what exactly would amount to “undermining” existing
instruments, frameworks, and bodies. Similarly, Article 4(3) of the 2019 Draft Text
requires that the ILBI shall be interpreted and applied in a way that promotes, but not
necessarily achieves, coherence and coordination between relevant instruments, frame-
works, and bodies. The impression that Article 4(3) could leave room for the ILBI to
deviate from existing instruments and frameworks can also be supported by the context
of Article 4(1) of the Draft Text. Giving effect to the normative criterion of full consist-
ency between the ILBI and the LOSC formulated in UNGA Resolution 72/249,174
Article 4(1) of the 2019 Draft Text stipulates:
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Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the rights, jurisdiction and duties of [s]tates
under the Convention. This Agreement shall be interpreted and applied in the context of
and in a manner consistent with the Convention.
This wording appears to require a higher level of compatibility between the ILBI and
the LOSC, when compared to Article 4(3) of the Draft Text, which does not state that
nothing in the ILBI shall prejudice the rights, jurisdiction, and duties of states under
existing instruments and frameworks.
As a consequence of not requiring full consistency between the ILBI and existing
instruments, frameworks, and bodies, Article 4(3) of the 2019 Draft Text would not
grant automatic priority in application to the Antarctic Treaty, the Madrid Protocol,
and CCAMLR, if the ILBI provides for substantively different regulation of bioprospect-
ing in the Southern Ocean. Nor would Article 4(3) of the Draft Text grant clear priority
to the ILBI over the different instruments of the ATS. Instead, one would, for instance,
need to interpret whether potential monetary benefit-sharing obligations under the ILBI
would undermine the ATS, which currently does not provide for monetary benefit-
sharing obligations. As a second example, it would similarly be subject to interpretation
whether more stringent obligations for in situ access in the ILBI, as compared to the
ATS, would undermine the ATS. If one interpreted the criterion of “not to undermine”
as stipulating a minimum standard, which was suggested as one interpretation,175 more
stringent obligations in the ILBI in terms of monetary benefit-sharing or in situ access
would arguably not undermine the ATS. Given the “ambiguity” of the term “not to
undermine,”176 however, one could similarly argue the alternative.
Finally, the last part of Article 4(3) of the Draft Text could allow for more clarity, as
it would subject the requirement of interpreting and applying the ILBI “in a manner
that [respects the competences of and] does not undermine [existing] relevant legal
instruments and frameworks and relevant global, regional and sectoral bodies, and that
promotes coherence and coordination with those instruments, frameworks and bodies”
to the condition that those instruments, frameworks, and bodies “are supportive of and
do not run counter to the objectives of the Convention and this Agreement.” In other
words, the ILBI could be interpreted and applied in a manner that, for instance, under-
mines an existing instrument, if the existing instrument in question were not supportive
of and ran counter to the objectives of the LOSC and the ILBI. This could strengthen
the normative position of the ILBI vis-a-vis existing legal instruments, frameworks, and
bodies that are relevant to BBNJ.
In this context, it is noteworthy that some scholars have explicitly suggested strength-
ening the normative position of the ILBI vis-a-vis existing legal instruments and frame-
works for BBNJ.177 For instance, Mendelhall et al. cautioned that putting too much
emphasis on the criterion of not to undermine “may be undermining the BBNJ process
as a whole, by preventing the emerging agreement from contributing to the evolution of
the ocean governance regime.”178 However, delegations, inter alia, from Mexico, the
Russian Federation, and the European Union (EU) during IGC III in 2019 proposed the
deletion of the very last part of Article 4(3) of the Draft Text.179 At the time of writing,
it thus remains to be seen how the BBNJ delegations will ultimately conceptualize the
normative and institutional integration of the ILBI within existing instruments, frame-
works, and bodies for BBNJ, such as the ATS.
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External Acceptance of the Antarctic Treaty System’s Competence for
Bioprospecting
As mentioned in the preceding, states are by virtue of the pacta tertiis principle not
bound by treaties they have not consented to. This notwithstanding, the ATCPs’ asser-
tion of competence vis-a-vis the BBNJ process does not appear to be limited to state
parties, as the statement proclaims that the ATS is “the competent framework within
which to address the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in the Antarctic
region.”180 For states that are not a party to any of the ATS instruments, but that will
become party to the ILBI, it is questionable whether the ATS would have any relevance
to the regulation of bioprospecting in the Southern Ocean. This question relates to the
debate on whether the Antarctic Treaty qualifies as an “objective regime,”181 which is a
“controversial category linked to the law of treaties, according to which some kinds of
treaties produce effects with regard to [s]tates not parties to it.”182 The question of
whether the ATS would have any relevance for states that are not a party to any of the
ATS instruments, but are a party to the ILBI, also relates to the broader question of
external acceptance of the Antarctic Treaty (System), which was repeatedly raised at the
United Nations in the form of the “Question of Antarctica” until 2005,183 when the
UNGA decided to “remain seized of the matter.”184
Whether the Antarctic Treaty can, as an objective regime, bind nonparties has been
discussed by scholars.185 Recently, Wolfrum has argued that “neither the Antarctic
Treaty or the Madrid Protocol, or the Recommendations of the ATCMs, create binding
obligations vis-a-vis third states.”186 However, Wolfrum has also suggested that “the
world community has over twenty years accepted the activities of the Consultative
Parties in Antarctica and has thus acquiesced to the latter, the general validity of the
Antarctic regime as such, and the functions exercised by the consultative parties.”187
Owing to space constraints, this article cannot discuss whether the Antarctic Treaty
qualifies as an objective regime or whether the states not party to ATS instruments
have in fact acquiesced to the ATS.
Instead, it suffices to note that the debate on whether the Antarctic Treaty qualifies
as an objective regime, as well as the broader question of external acceptance of the
ATS, could be reignited if the ILBI ultimately overlaps with the ATS and provides for
conflicting regulation of bioprospecting. For example, a particular challenge for external
acceptance of the ATS’s competence to regulate bioprospecting may arise if the ILBI
establishes monetary benefit-sharing obligations that are not currently provided for by
the ATS.
Conclusion
Bioprospecting in the Southern Ocean is already subject to a complicated regulatory set-
ting, consisting of the different instruments of the ATS as well as the LOSC and the
CBD.188 If adopted, the ILBI would, to the extent that it applies to the Southern Ocean,
add an additional regulatory layer. After revisiting here the issue of bioprospecting in
the Southern Ocean in the context of the BBNJ negotiations, the following points can
be reiterated.
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First, the extent of the potential overlap between the ILBI and the ATS will likely be
subject to different interpretations, given the fundamentally opposing views regarding
the validity of the maritime zones under national jurisdiction asserted from the
Antarctic continent.189 Crucially, clarifying the extent of ABNJ off the shore of
Antarctica to which the ILBI would apply will require states to explicitly address the
contentious question of the validity of the maritime zones under national jurisdiction
asserted from the Antarctic continent.
Second, there is potential for substantive differences to arise in the regulation of bio-
prospecting between the ILBI and the ATS. Owing to space constraints, this point has
been illustrated in the context of regulating in situ access to MGRs, as well as the non-
monetary and monetary benefit-sharing obligations. An obvious caveat to the observa-
tion that the ILBI might differ from how the ATS regulates bioprospecting is of course
that the BBNJ negotiations are ongoing, which means that the content of future provi-
sions on MGRs remains an open question.
Third, the likely spatial overlap between the ILBI and the ATS, combined with the
potential for substantive differences regarding the regulation of bioprospecting, begs the
question of how the ILBI will normatively and institutionally relate to the ATS. For
state parties of the ATS, which also become party to the ILBI, the question of which
regime to comply with—the ILBI or the ATS—may arise. In addition, it is uncertain
which decision-making fora will be competent to regulate bioprospecting activities in
the Southern Ocean: the ATS (such as the ATCM or the CCAMLR Commission) or a
future ILBI body.
Despite the assertion of competence by the ATCPs vis-a-vis the BBNJ process, this
article has argued that unless the ILBI explicitly decides to regulate the relationship
between the ILBI and the ATS (or exclude its applicability to the Southern Ocean
altogether), the normative criterion of “not to undermine existing instruments, frame-
works, and bodies” is the key to determining how the ILBI will normatively and institu-
tionally relate to the ATS. In this respect, the fifth section offered some reflections on
Article 4(3) of the 2019 Draft Text, which would, as a suggested conflict clause, oper-
ationalize the normative criterion of “not to undermine.” Importantly, at the time of
writing, the BBNJ delegations are still in the process of finding a compromise in terms
of how to integrate the ILBI normatively and institutionally within the existing instru-
ments, frameworks, and bodies for BBNJ.
As highlighted in the introduction, Scott pointed in the context of the BBNJ process
to a “potentially competitive relationship between the ATS and external regimes” for
the regulation of bioprospecting.190 To what extent the future relationship between the
ILBI and the ATS will indeed prove to be competitive, will, inter alia, depend (i) on
whether the ILBI and the ATS will overlap spatially in the Southern Ocean, (ii) on the
degree to which the ILBI will substantively differ from the way the ATS currently regu-
lates bioprospecting, and (iii) on how the BBNJ delegations will operationalize the nor-
mative requirement of the “not to undermine existing instruments, frameworks, and
bodies” in a future conflict clause in the ILBI.
Finally, it can be recalled that the ATCPs’ assertion of competence vis-a-vis the BBNJ
process does not appear to be limited to state parties of the ATS. Against this backdrop,
this article has highlighted that the debate on whether the Antarctic Treaty qualifies as
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an objective regime, as well as the broader question of external acceptance of the ATS
by third states, could be reignited if the ILBI ultimately overlaps with the ATS and pro-
vides for conflicting regulation of bioprospecting.
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